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Abstract 
Using data from the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database II, this 
paper first provides information on the nature of terrorist incidents in India in the 
period 1998-2004: the Indian states that were worst affected by terrorist incidents and 
fatalities; the terrorist groups responsible for such incidents and their modus operandi.  
Next, the paper focuses on the issue of fatalities from terrorist incidents. It inquires 
into the extent to which the number of fatalities following an incident was influenced 
by the type of attack (bombings, armed assault etc.) and the extent to which it was 
influenced by the type of terrorist group. By examining the number of fatalities 
resulting from terrorist attacks in India, the paper disentangles the influence on this 
number of attack type and attack group.  Lastly, the paper applies Atkinson’s concept 
of equality-adjusted income to terrorism to arrive at the concept of equality-adjusted 
deaths from terrorist incidents: in order to avoid spectacular incidents resulting in the 
loss of a large number of lives – as in New York on September 11, 2001 and in 
Mumbai 26-29 November 2008 – “society” might be prepared to tolerate “low-grade” 
terrorism which resulted in a larger number of deaths in total but avoided a large 
number of deaths from a single iconic incident. 
Keywords: Terrorism, Terrorist groups, Attack Type, India 
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1.  Introduction 
 This paper uses data from the LaFree and Dugan (2008) Global Terrorism 
Database II (see also, LaFree, Dugan, Fogg, and Scott, 2006) to study the nature of 
terrorist incidents in India in the seven-year period, 1998-2004.  As LaFree and 
Dugan (2008) observe, although the heightened consciousness of the menace of 
terrorism of the past decade has led to a considerable increase in the literature on this 
subject, much of this literature has been based on non-quantitative evidence: informed 
opinion, intuition, and anecdotal evidence.  In order, therefore, to provide a 
quantitative base for the study of terrorism, LaFree and Dugan (2008) and LaFree, 
Dugan, Fogg, and Scott (2006), under the auspices of the National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism, have provided two Global 
Terrorism Databases (GTD): GTD1 and GTD2 record, as far as is feasible, all known 
terrorist incidents in the world
1
, along with ancillary information about the nature of 
these incidents, for, respectively, the periods 1970-1997 and 1998-2004.
2
 
 Silke (2001) has addressed the issue of methodological issues in research on 
terrorism. He argued that “most research [on terrorism] is based on secondary data 
analysis and more specifically on analysis based on archival records” and that, in 
particular, “over 80 per cent of all research on terrorism is based either solely or 
                                                 
1
 In order to be considered a "terrorist incident" by the GTD, the event had to have been committed by 
non-state actors, had to have been violent, and intentional. In addition the act must have met two of the 
following three criteria: (1) The act must have been aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, 
or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit did not satisfy this criterion. 
(2) There must have been evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message 
to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. (3) The action must have been outside 
the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. the act must have been outside the parameters permitted 
by international humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians 
or non-combatants).  (LaFree and Dugan , 2008). 
2
 To produce the GTD2 an administrative staff managed both paid and volunteer researchers who 
monitored a variety of open sources, identified potential cases for inclusion in the database and then 
coded these cases. Data in this collection contain 7,154 events .The main variable categories presented 
in these data include: Identification Numbers, Incident Date, Incident Location, Incident Information, 
Attack Information, Target Information, Perpetrator Information, Perpetrator Statistics, Perpetrator 
Claim of Responsibility, Weapon Information, Casualty Information, Consequences, 
Hostage/Kidnapping. (LaFree and Dugan , 2008). 
 2 
primarily on data gathered from books, journals, the media (or media-derived 
databases), or other published documents.” (p.5). However, within this research 
genre, Silke (2001) shows that there has been very little attempt to match data from 
secondary sources to the tools of statistical analysis: 5 percent of papers published in 
major terrorism journals in 2000 involved inferential analysis; 15 percent used 
descriptive statistics, and the remaining 80 percent did not involve any statistical 
analysis whatsoever.
3
 
 Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to undertake a 
quantitative analysis of deaths from terrorism using data from GTD2. The focus of the 
analysis is on India. GTD2 recorded 7,184 terrorist incidents between 1998 and 2004.  
The largest number of terrorist incidents occurred in India (784), followed by 
Colombia (571), the Russian Federation (435), and Algeria (426).
4
   In terms of 
terrorist-related fatalities, India (3,008 deaths) again headed the list of countries 
followed by the USA ((2,385), Algeria (2,273), Iraq (2,203) and the Russian 
Federation (2,097).
5
 Consequently, there is a strong justification for examining 
terrorist actions in India.
6
 This justification has only been strengthened with the brutal 
and bloody terrorist attack on Mumbai’s residents in November 2008. 
 The issue of terrorist related deaths has been addressed by Hultman (2007): 
employing monthly data on 60 rebel groups, involved in armed conflict in the period 
January 2002 to December 2004, she showed that rebels killed more civilians the 
                                                 
3
 By contrast, 86 percent of papers in forensic psychology and 60 percent of papers in criminology 
contained some form of statistical analysis with a majority of these employing inferential methods.  
4
 Other countries in which a substantial number of terrorist incidents occurred were: the Philippines 
(380), Iraq (317), Spain (284), Northern Ireland (235), Turkey (224), Indonesia (214), Palestine (209), 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (202), Afghanistan (199), Israel (191), and Sri Lanka (158).  
5
 Other countries in which a substantial number of terrorist-related fatalities occurred were: Colombia 
(1,696), Angola (1,464), Nepal (1,386), Sri Lanka (1,296), the Philippines (912), and Pakistan (878). 
6
 More recently, only Iraq has had more terrorist incidents than India. Even so, there have been seven 
major terrorist incidents in India in 2008: Jaipur (May 13), Bangalore (July 25), Ahmedabad (July 26), 
Surat (July 27/28), New Delhi (September 13), Assam (October 30), and, most spectacularly, Mumbai 
(November 26-29): collectively, these have resulted in nearly 400 fatalities.  
 3 
more fighters they lost in battle. Piazza (2009) has examined the hypothesis that 
Islamist terrorist groups are more dangerous than non-Islamist groups because they 
cause more casualties. The rise in the casualty rate from terrorism (the average 
number of dead and wounded from terrorist incidents), from 2.08 between 1968 and 
1979 to 10.89 for the period 200 to 2005, is conventionally explained by the parallel 
rise in religious (i.e. Islamic) terrorism. Using data from the Terrorism Knowledge 
Base for 135 groups and 383 incidents he showed that such a sweeping conclusion 
needed to be tempered by the “ideological orientation” of the Islamist groups with 
groups associated with al-Qaida being much more lethal than other, more secular, 
Islamist groups.  
 This paper complements existing (quantitative) studies of the number of 
victims (dead and wounded) from terrorism by taking a different, but not unrelated, 
line.  It hypothesises that the number of fatalities following a terrorist incident would 
be influenced by the type of attack (bombing, armed assault etc.) and by the type of 
terrorist group carrying out the attack.  For example, ceteris paribus armed assaults 
might, on average, result in more deaths than bombings but the number of deaths 
might also be influenced by whether the armed assault or bombing was carried out by 
Islamic jihadists or by Marxists. By examining the number of fatalities resulting from 
terrorist attacks in India, it disentangles, using the decomposition methodology of 
Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) – hereafter, the B-O decomposition - the influence 
on this number of attack type and attack group.    
    The second strand of this paper is concerned with the “price” society might 
be prepared to pay to avoid spectacular (and iconic) terrorist incidents.  Weinberg et. 
al. (2008) have drawn attention to the restrictions on civil liberties that followed the 
9/11 attack in New York; in a similar vein, 26/11 in Mumbai was followed by a 
 4 
clamour for war with Pakistan.
7
 In order to avoid such political and social (and 
economic) turbulence, “society” might be prepared to tolerate a higher number of 
terrorist-related deaths, provided these were sufficiently evenly distributed between 
incidents as to obviate any particular incident being viewed as iconic.
8
 
 This strand is grounded in Atkinson’s (1970) concept of equality-adjusted 
income: being averse to inequality, society regards a smaller level of national income, 
which is equally distributed, as yielding the same amount of social welfare as a larger, 
but unequally distributed, income; the reduction in income that society is prepared to 
countenance depends upon its aversion to inequality.  In this paper the concept is 
extended to terrorism by developing the idea of the “equality-adjusted number of 
deaths” from terrorist incidents: in order to avoid the social and political fall-out from 
spectacular incidents resulting in the loss of a large number of lives – as in New York 
on September 11, 2001 and in Mumbai 26-29 November 2008 – “society” might be 
prepared to tolerate “low-grade” terrorism which resulted in a larger number of deaths 
in total but avoided a large number of deaths from a single iconic incident. Estimates 
of such equality-adjusted deaths, under different degrees of inequality aversion, are 
provided. 
2. An Overview of Terrorist Incidents in India 
 This section provides information on the nature of terrorist incidents in India 
in the period 1998-2004: the Indian states worst affected by terrorist incidents and 
fatalities and the terrorist groups responsible for such incidents and their modus 
                                                 
7
 The Financial Times reported a former Indian ambassador to the United Nations as demanding that 
“if there is another attack we should go in and bomb the daylights out of them” (Indian hawks call for 
strike on Pakistan, 19 December 2008) 
8
 Frey (2004) has drawn attention to the economic effects of terrorism. The targeting of tourism means 
that a typical terrorist attack deters nearly 140,000 tourists (Enders, Parise, and Sandler, 1992). 
Terrorism reduces the inflow of foreign direct investment into a country (Enders and Sandler, 1996), 
bilateral trade flows with other countries (Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004), and the share price of 
companies, and levels of income, in terrorist-affected regions (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003 
 5 
operandi. Over the period 1998-2004, there were, according to GTD2, 784 terrorist 
incidents in India which resulted in 3,008 deaths.  Table 1 shows that 61 percent of 
these incidents (480 in number) and 55 percent of these fatalities (1,658 in number) 
occurred in Jammu and Kashmir followed by: 11 percent of incidents (85) and 13 
percent of fatalities (376) in Assam; 6 percent of incidents (48) and 3 percent of 
fatalities (90) in Andhra Pradesh; and 3 percent of incidents in Bihar and Tripura (26 
and 25 respectively) but with 5 percent of fatalities (156) in Bihar and 3 percent (25) 
in Tripura. If one considers the North-East of India in its entirety – Arunachal 
Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura – then 123 
incidents (16 percent of the all-India total of 784 incidents) and 682 fatalities (23 
percent of the all-India total of 3,008 fatalities) occurred in this region.  Thus, 
between 1998 and 2004, the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh, and 
Bihar and the North-East of India collectively accounted for 86 percent of terrorist 
incidents and of incident-derived fatalities in India.
9
  
 None of these three theatres of conflict – Jammu and Kashmir, the North-East 
of India, and Bihar and Andhra Pradesh – should be viewed as isolated conflicts,  
independent of events on the international stage and of each other. Haleem (2004) has 
argued that, apart from home grown terrorists, the Kashmir dispute has attracted al-
Qaida fighters who view the dispute as part of a larger Islamic strategy.  The Lashkar-
e-Taib’s agenda, as outlined in a pamphlet titled, "Why are we waging jihad," 
includes the restoration of Islamic rule over all parts of India; the pamphlet also 
declares the United States, Israel, and India as existential enemies of Islam (Haqqani, 
2005).  Similarly, Mehra (2000) has drawn attention to the absence of agrarian reform 
                                                 
9
 The largest number of fatalities from a single incident were: 52 in Mumbai, 25 August 2003; 35 in 
Pahalgam (J&K),1 August 2000 and Chadisinghpoora (J&K), 21 March 2000; 34 in  Kaluchak  (J&K), 
14 May 2002, 32 in Sinari (Bihar), 18 March 1999. Apart from the Mumbai bombing, the other 
incidents were armed assaults.  
 6 
in India, and Borooah (2009) to poverty and illiteracy in Indian districts, as factors 
explaining the rise in Marxist violence in certain parts of India.  Lastly, Saikia (2003) 
has linked the ethnic-based and non-Islamic terrorist movements in the North-East of 
India to a wider Islamic agenda in which al-Qaida operatives in Bangladesh are 
fomenting the creation of a “Greater Bangladesh” (Brihot Bangladesh) and are 
subordinating the traditional pro-Hindu loyalties of the United Liberation Front of 
Assam (ULFA) to this end.        
 Table 2 shows terrorist incidents, and fatalities resulting from such incidents 
by the main terrorist groupings. In the Indian context there were three main groups of 
terrorists: Islamic; Marxist; and North-Eastern terrorist groups.  These three groups 
collectively accounted for 298 (38 percent of the total of 784) incidents and 1,667 (55 
percent of the total of 3,008) fatalities in India.
10
  The main Islamic groups were the 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (47 incidents, 371 fatalities), Hizb-ul-Mujahidin (34 incidents, 173 
fatalities), and Jaish-e-Mohammad (11 incidents, 39 fatalities).
11
  The main Marxist 
groups were the People’s War Group (46 incidents, 189 fatalities) and the Maoist 
Communist Centre (14 incidents, 98 fatalities).
12
 The main North-East groups were 
                                                 
10
 The perpetrators of the remaining incidents were either unknown (399 out of 784) or small, isolated 
groups. 
11
 Lashkar-e-Taiba (Soldiers of the Pure) rose to prominence nearly 10 years ago and has often been 
blamed by the Indian authorities for carrying out armed attacks, not only in Kashmir, but also 
elsewhere in India.. It is held responsible for the Mumbai bombings of August 2003 and of the attack 
on the Indian Parliament in December 2001(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3181925.stm). 
Hizb ul-Mujahidin, the largest Kashmiri militant group, was founded in 1989 and officially supports 
the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan, although some cadres are pro-
independence. The group is the militant wing of Pakistan’s largest Islamic political party, the Jamaat-i-
Islami. It currently is focused on Indian security forces and politicians in Jammu and Kashmir and has 
conducted operations jointly with other Kashmiri militants (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/hm.htm). 
12
 The People’s War Group, which was formed in Southern Indian State of Andhra Pradesh in 1980, 
traces its ideology to the Chinese leader Mao Tse Tung’s theory of organised peasant insurrection. It 
rejects parliamentary democracy and believes in capturing political power through protracted armed 
struggle based on guerrilla warfare. This strategy entails building up of bases in rural and remote areas 
and transforming them first into guerrilla zones and then as liberated zones, besides the area-wise 
seizure and encircling cities. The eventual objective is to install a "people’s government" through the 
"people’s war" (http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/PWG.htm).  The Maoist 
Communist Center is a major force in rural Bihar.  In some parts it ran a parallel judicial system, with a 
system of people's courts. The expansion of the party occurred as it became one of several caste-based 
armed groups in the area. The party mobilized lower-caste Biharis and frequently clashed with various 
 7 
the United Liberation Front of Assam (36 incidents, 165 fatalities), the National 
Liberation Front of Tripura and the All Tripura Tiger Force (collectively, 27 
incidents, 196 fatalities), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland and the Bodo 
Liberation Tigers (collectively, 20 incidents, 141 fatalities).
13
 
 Of the 126 incidents for which the Islamic groups were responsible, 12 were 
suicide attacks and, of these 12 suicide attacks: six were by the Lashkar-e-Taiba, two 
were by its surrogate, Al-Mansurian [LeT front], and two were by the Jaish-e-
Mohammad.  The Marxist and North-Eastern groups were responsible for one suicide 
attack each by, respectively, the People’s War Group and the United Liberation Front 
of Assam. 
3. Fatalities, Attack Type, and Terrorist Groups  
      For each of the 784 terrorist incidents in India between 1998 and 2004, GTD2 
provided details of the incident’s primary type of attack: bombing (378 incidents); 
armed assault – that is, an attack whose primary objective was to cause physical harm, 
including death, to individuals by means other than explosives (298); assassination – 
that is, an attack whose primary objective was to kill one or more prominent persons  
(52); infrastructure attack – that is, an attack whose primary objective was to damage 
non-human targets using non-explosive means like arson (35); hostage taking – that 
is, an attack whose primary objective was to obtain concessions in exchange for 
                                                                                                                                            
militia groups (like the Ranvir Sena) defending upper-caste interests 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maoist_Communist_Centre_of_India#Dakshin_Desh). 
13
 The United Liberation Front of Assam is a militant group from Assam, among many other such 
groups in North-East India. It seeks to establish a sovereign Assam via an armed struggle. The 
Government of India had banned the organization in 1990 and classifies it as a terrorist group. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Liberation_Front_of_Asom).  The National Democratic Front of 
Bodoland aims to get a sovereign Bodoland north of the Brahmaputra River. It was very active during 
the 1990s. However, under an agreement on May 24, 2005 with the Government of India, it has been 
maintaining a ceasefire (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Democratic_Front_of_Bodoland).   The 
National Liberation Front of Tripura was formed in December 1989 to create an independent state of 
Tripura. It has conducted a systematic and violent campaign for secession from India and has been 
declared  by the Government of India as a terrorist organization 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Liberation_Front_of_Tripura). 
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release of hostages (20).  It should be emphasised that these were the primary types of 
attack; some incidents involved more than one type of attack. 
 GTD2 also provided details of the target of attack. If one collapses its 
information into military/police (MP) and non-military/police targets (NMP), then of 
the total of 784 terrorist incidents in India, in the period 1998-2004, 394 incidents (40 
percent) were directed towards MP targets. Islamic terrorists directed 56 percent of 
their incidents (71 out of 126) towards MP targets, followed by Marxists and North-
Eastern terrorists who directed, respectively, 37 and 27 percent of their incidents 
towards MP targets.    
 The number of fatalities resulting from an incident depended upon both the 
type of attack. Table 3 shows that armed assaults resulted in 6.05 fatalities per 
incident, followed by 2.78 fatalities for bombings. However there was hardly any 
difference in fatality rates in respect of the target of attack: it was 3.75 for MP targets 
(1,164 deaths from 310 incidents) and 3.80 for NMP targets (1,844 deaths from 474 
incidents). Table 4 shows that average fatalities were: 6.21 per incident when Islamic 
group carried out attacks; 5.63 per incident for North-Eastern groups; and 4.52 for 
Marxist groups.  Consequently, the number of fatalities from a terrorist incident 
would depend upon the type of attack and upon the group responsible for the attack.  
Table 5 combines Tables 3 and 4 to show the modes of attack in terrorist incidents in 
India, between 1998 and 2004, for which Islamic, Marxist and North-Eastern groups 
were responsible 
 Table 6 shows the estimates from a regression equation in which the number 
of fatalities following a terrorist incident is “explained” by the type of attack 
 9 
(bombing, armed assault, “other” attack types14) and by the type of terrorist group 
(Islamic, Marxist, North-Eastern, “residual”15).   
 Terrorist groups differ in the quality of their “equipment” where this may be 
psychological (ruthlessness, commitment, preparedness to die) as well as physical 
(quality of weapons and training, the size and quality of the support group).
16
  It is, 
therefore, possible that the fatalities resulting from a particular attack type (say, armed 
assault) might be different if it was carried out by an Islamic group compared to a 
North-Eastern group.  In order to account for this, the fatalities equation was 
estimated allowing the coefficients on the bombing and armed assault terms to vary 
by terrorist group.
17
   
 Table 6 shows that an incident caused by a residual group (that is, one which 
was not Islamic/Marxist/North-Eastern), using a type of assault which was neither 
bombing nor an armed assault, would result in (an average of) 1.11 casualties; a 
bombing would have added 0.74 fatalities, and an armed assault would have added 
3.79 fatalities, to this number.  When, however, an Islamic group carried out an armed 
assault, the average number of fatalities would rise by a further 2.07+1.01=3.08 
reaching a total of 7.98.  Table 7 sets out more succinctly the fatalities implied by the 
regression estimates of Table 6. 
 The results shown in Tables 6 (and its derivative, Table 7) raise the question 
of why the number of fatalities (fatality rates), following a terrorist incident, differed 
according to the terrorist group responsible. Was it due to inter-group differences in 
“equipment” (as defined earlier)? For example, as Table 7 shows, the fatality rate 
                                                 
14
 Assassination, infrastructure attack, hostages. This “other” type of attack was the residual. 
15
 Identified and unidentified perpetrators. 
16
 They differ also in the quality of the opposition that they face: dealing with the might of the Indian 
army and Indian paramilitary forces in Kashmir is a different proposition from dealing with the district 
police in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh. 
17
 The technical appendix to this paper provides details of the estimating equation. 
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from terrorist incidents, under an armed assault, was: 7.98 when Islamic groups were 
responsible, 5.54 when Marxist groups were responsible and 7.94 when North-Eastern 
groups were responsible. Or could the inter-group difference in fatality rates be 
explained by the fact that different groups were disposed towards different types of 
attack?  For example, as Table 5 shows, 41 percent of Islamic incidents involved 
armed assault as the primary mode of attack, compared to 35 percent for Marxist 
groups, and 58 percent for North-Eastern groups.  The next section addresses this 
question. 
4. The Decomposition of Fatalities from Terrorist Incidents 
    The B-O method (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) of decomposing differences 
between groups, in their respective mean values, into “discrimination” and 
“characteristics” components is, arguably, the most widely used decomposition 
technique in economics. In this section, this method is applied to decomposing the 
average number of fatalities from terrorist incidents into an “attack type” and a “group 
type” effect. 
 The basic idea behind this decomposition is as follows, the details being 
provided in the technical appendix to this paper. The difference between average 
fatalities from, say, Islamic and Marxist terrorist incidents could be due to, at least, 
two reasons.  First, the two groups employed, on average, different attack types: as 
Table 3 shows, the fatality rate was different between incidents in which the primary 
modes of attack were bombing and armed assaults.  Second, the two groups differed 
in terms of their residual factors: that is all those factors not explicitly controlled for 
in the regression equation. At the risk of simplification, we identify this residual 
largely with differences in the mental and physical equipment of the terrorist groups: 
 11 
as Table 4 shows, the fatality rate was considerably higher in incidents for which 
Islamic, compared to Marxist, groups were responsible. 
 There is evidence establishing the rigours of jihadist training. Lia (2008)’s 
study of such training argues that there is considerable agreement among jihadists 
about the importance of training - “training and preparation is an integral part of jihad 
and therefore an individual religious duty…ideological indoctrination and spiritual 
preparation takes precedence over physical and military training. Moreover, since 
jihad is such a painful and brutal process, the preparatory process must accustom the 
recruit to this reality: they must learn determination, patience, and self-sacrifice; they 
should learn to endure the brutality of war, but also to employ its savagery against 
Islam’s enemies.” (p. 519).  
 In addition to the rigours of training, Pakistani jihadists appeared to have the 
full support of their families. Fair (2008) surveyed 141 Pakistani families whose male 
members had become shaheed (martyrs) in Kashmir and Afghanistan. As Fair (2008, 
p. 60) notes “Pakistan, like Palestine and other theatres for Islamist conflict, has a rich 
martyrdom culture wherein the community confers an important status to families of 
shaheed.”  Fair (2008) argues that, contrary to popular belief, Pakistani terrorists 
operating in Kashmir and Afghanistan, and their households, were very well educated 
by Pakistani standards.  So, in terms of equipment, there is evidence that Islamic 
jihadists operating in India were sufficiently well educated and motivated to readily 
absorb the high quality of training they received.   
 We can disentangle these influences by considering a hypothetical situation in 
which the “equipment” factor is held constant. This is done by answering the 
(hypothetical) question: what would the average number of fatalities have been if, in 
incidents for which Marxists were responsible, the “attack type” had been carried out 
 12 
using Islamic “equipment”?  Call this the “Marxist [Islamic]” fatality rate. The 
difference between the average fatality rate from incidents for which Islamic groups 
were responsible and the “Marxist [Islamic]” fatality rate isolates the effect of attack 
type: holding “equipment” constant at Islamic levels, this difference represents the 
inter-group difference in fatality rates due to differences between the two groups in 
their attack types.  Call this the inter-group attack type difference. 
 The hypothetical question could, of course, have been posed differently: what 
would the average number of fatalities have been if, in incidents for which Islamic 
groups were responsible, the “attack type” had been carried out using Marxist 
“equipment”?  Call this the “Islamic [Marxist]” fatality rate.  The difference between 
the average fatality rate from incidents for which Islamic groups were responsible and 
the “Marxist [Islamic]” fatality rate also isolates the effect of attack type: holding 
“equipment” constant at Marxist levels, this difference also represents the inter-group 
difference in fatality rates due to differences between the two groups in their attack 
types.    
 The gap between the observed inter-group difference in fatality rates and the 
attack type difference is the residual difference.  It represents that part of the 
(observed) difference in average fatality rates between Islamic and Marxist terrorist 
incidents that cannot be explained by differences between them in their attack type.  
By default, this residual is then attributed to differences between them in their 
“equipment”.  It is important to point out that the two separate conceptions of inter-
group attack type difference – the first based on the “Marxist [Islamic]”, and the 
second on the “Islamic [Marxist]”, fatality rate - need not be equal. Consequently, the 
residual effects, from the two formulations of the hypothetical question, need not be 
equal. Indeed, this a well-known problem with the B-O decomposition: the relative 
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sizes of the two attribute (“attack type”) effects will be different depending upon the 
choice of a common set of coefficients (Islamic or Marxist) for comparing the effects 
of the two different sets of attributes (“attack types”). 
 Table 8 shows the results from the B-O decomposition of fatality rates by the 
three main terrorist group types operating in India: Islamic, Marxist, and North-
Eastern.  The first row panel of the Table compares Islamic with Marxist groups. The 
second column item in this row shows that the difference in average fatality rates 
between Islamic (6.21) and Marxist (4.52) terrorist incidents was 1.69.  The column 
following this shows that if Marxist terrorist incidents had been carried out using 
Islamic “equipment”, the fatality rate from Marxist incidents would have risen to 
5.75, narrowing the Islamic-Marxist fatality rate gap to 0.46.  
 In other words, 27 percent of the observed difference in fatality rates between 
Islamic and Marxist groups (0.46 of 1.69) could be explained by the fact that, 
compared to Islamic terrorists, Marxists, on average, adopted a different attack type: 
as Table 5 shows, 41 percent of Islamic, compared to 35 percent of Marxist, incidents 
involved armed assault as the primary mode of attack. The remaining difference (73 
percent: 1.23 of 1.69) was explained by “equipment” differences between Islamic and 
Marxist terrorist groups. 
 The last panel of Table 8, under the column headed “attack type difference”, 
shows that if Islamic terrorist incidents had been carried out using Marxist 
“equipment”, the fatality rate from Islamic incidents would have fallen to 5.19 
narrowing the gap between Islamic and Marxist fatality rates to 0.67. Thus, on this 
reckoning, 40 percent of the observed difference in fatality rates between Islamic and 
Marxist groups (0.67 of 1.69) could be explained by the fact that, compared to Islamic 
terrorists, Marxists, on average, adopted a different attack type; by corollary, 60 
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percent was explained by “equipment” differences between Islamic and Marxist 
terrorist groups. 
 The middle row panel of Table 8 compares Islamic with North-Eastern groups. 
There was a difference of 0.58 in the average number of fatalities resulting from 
incidents for which the two groups were responsible (Islamic: 6.21; North-Eastern: 
5.63). If North-Eastern terrorist groups had carried out their attacks using Islamic 
“equipment” the fatality rate from such incidents would have risen to 6.65, higher 
than the average fatality rate of 6.21 from Islamic terrorist incidents.  Similarly, as the 
last panel of Table 8 shows, if Islamic terrorists had carried out their attacks using 
North-Eastern levels of “equipment”, the average fatality rate from Islamic incidents 
would have fallen to 4.95, lower than the average fatality rate of 5.63 from North-
Eastern terrorist incidents. 
 The reason for this is two-fold. First, as Table 3 shows, the fatality rate from 
armed assault was substantially higher than that from other attack forms. Second, as 
Table 5 shows, 58 percent of North-Eastern - compared to 44 percent of Islamic - 
incidents, involved armed assault as the primary mode of attack.  Consequently, what 
keeps the fatality rate from terrorist incidents perpetrated by North-East groups lower 
than those perpetrated by Islamic groups is that the former do not operate with the 
“equipment” of Islamic terrorists: had they received the training and weapons of, and 
been as ruthless and committed as, Islamic terrorists, the fatality rate in the North-East 
from terrorist incidents would have been much higher than it was. 
 It is possible to offer some justification for the above statement.  First, the 
quality of training received by Islamic jihadists, operating mainly in Kashmir but also 
in other parts of India, has been commented upon. Second, as is widely accepted, the 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of the Pakistani army has played a not inconsiderable 
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role in providing such training and the ancillary guns and explosives.
18
 Of the 
countries neighbouring the north eastern states of India, the role of Bhutan and Nepal 
has largely been to provide safe havens for terrorists from these states: indeed, ULFA 
and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland have had their headquarters in 
Bhutan.  However Saikia (2002) reports that the ISI is operating camps in Bangladesh 
providing training in terrorist activities to North-Eastern groups collectively known as 
the United Liberation Front of the Seven Sisters.
19
   Indeed, as long ago as March 
1994 the Assam Assembly was told that about 200 ULFA members had received 
training from the ISI (Verghese, 1996, p. 60).     
 The last panel of Table 8 compares fatality rates between North-Eastern and 
Marxist group incidents. The average number of fatalities rates from Marxist incidents 
was 1.11 fewer than from North-Eastern incidents. Of this difference, 60 percent 
could be explained by differences in attack type between the two groups if Marxist 
incidents were carried out using North-Eastern “equipment” (0.68 of 1.11); on the 
other hand, if North-Eastern incidents were carried out using Marxist “equipment”, 51 
percent of the North-Eastern-Marxist difference in fatality rates (0.57 of 1.11) could 
be explained by differences in attack type between the two groups. 
5. Inequality Analysis of Deaths from Terrorist Incidents in India 
 The previous discussion was based on an analysis of the average number of 
fatalities from incidents for which terrorist groups in India were responsible. 
However, focusing exclusively on the average ignores the distribution of the total 
number of deaths across incidents: the total that results from a few spectacular 
incidents producing a large number of deaths, with the majority of incidents being 
                                                 
18
 The ISI, with its headquarters in Islamabad and headed by a lieutenant general of the Pakistani army, 
is in complete charge of all covert operations outside Pakistan.  
19
 The north east of India comprises seven states. 
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relatively light on fatalities, might also be the result of a relatively equal distribution 
of fatalities across incidents. 
 In order to address the distributional issue, we computed the Gini coefficient 
for the distribution of fatalities, in incidents for which the three main terrorist groups 
in India – Islamic, Marxist, and North-Eastern - were responsible, for the two major 
types of attack: armed assault and bombing.  Applied to the distribution of fatalities 
from terrorist incidents, if N is the number of incidents, and Fi is the number of (non-
terrorist) deaths from incident i (i=1…N), and 
1
/
N
i
i
F N

  represents the average 
number of deaths, the Gini coefficient is defined as: 
 
2
1 1
1
| |
2
N N
i j
i j
G F F
N   
   
In other words, the Gini coefficient is computed as half the mean of the difference in 
the number of deaths between pairs of incidents, divided by the average ().  So, 
G=0.45 implies that the difference in the number of deaths between two incidents 
chosen at random will be 90 percent of the average number of deaths: if =1, this 
difference will be 0.9 fatalities. 
 Table 9 shows that, judging by the values of the Gini coefficient, the 
distributions of the 415 deaths resulting from the 52 armed assault incidents for which 
Islamic groups were responsible, and the 144 deaths resulting from the 26 armed 
incidents for which Marxist groups were responsible, displayed similar degrees of 
inequality (Gini coefficient of 0.534 and 0.538, respectively); however, the inter-
incident distribution of the 445 deaths resulting from the 56 armed assault incidents 
for which the North-Eastern groups were responsible was much more equal (Gini 
coefficient of 0.35). On the other hand, as Table 9 shows, there was considerable 
inequality in the distribution of fatalities of the deaths resulting from bombing: the 
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values of the Gini coefficient for bombing deaths were 0.7229 for Islamic groups; 
0.607 for Marxist groups; and 0.619 for North-Eastern groups. 
 What is the social loss from terrorist incidents? If the number of fatalities is 
used as an indicator of loss, then both the average number of deaths and the inter-
incident distribution of deaths serve to determine the size of social loss. In his seminal 
paper on income inequality, Atkinson (1970) argued that “society” would be prepared 
to accept a reduction in average income, provided the lower income was equally 
distributed, from a higher average income which was unequally distributed.
20
 The size 
of this reduction depended upon our degree of "inequality aversion" which Atkinson 
(1970) measured by the value of an “inequality aversion” parameter 0  .21  
 In a similar vein, Anand and Sen (1997) compared the Honduras (with an 
average literacy rate of 75%, distributed between men and women as 78%, 73%) with 
China (with an average literacy rate of 80%, distributed between men and women as 
92%, 68%) and asked which country should be regarded as having the "better" 
achievement with regard to literacy: China with a higher overall rate or the Honduras 
with greater gender equality? 
 These ideas can, equally well, be applied to the measurement of the social loss 
from terrorism. If one is to averse to spectacular, high-profile incidents – 9/11 in New 
York, 26/11 in Mumbai – in which a large number of innocent lives are lost, with the 
consequence that the prevailing socio-political mood becomes one of fear, insecurity, 
and paranoia, then one might “prefer” low-grade terrorism with several low-fatality 
incidents, and no high-fatality ones, to an iconic incident(s) which inflicts death on a 
                                                 
20
 In the language of economics, the two situations would yield the same level of social welfare, i.e. be 
'welfare equivalent'. 
21
 When 0  , we are not at all averse to inequality implying that we would not be prepared to accept 
even the smallest reduction in average income in order to secure an equitable distribution. The degree 
of inequality aversion increases with the value of  : the higher the value of , the more averse we 
would be to inequality and, in order to secure an equitable distribution of income, the greater the 
reduction in average income we would find acceptable. 
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large scale. We can increase the average number of deaths from terrorist incidents in a 
country, F , by the amount of inter-incident inequality in fatalities, to arrive at eF , an 
"equity sensitive" fatality rate for the country, .eF F .  We refer to eF  as the equally 
distributed equivalent fatality rate:  when every terrorist incident results in exactly eF  
deaths, eF is welfare equivalent to F . 
 Following from this, Atkinson’s (1970) index, defined with respect to the 
parameter,, as applied to differences between terrorist incidents in their number of 
deaths, yields: 
 
1/(1 )
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 When =0, society is indifferent about the inter-incident distribution of a 
given total of deaths from terrorist incidents and eF F ; for >0,  eF F  and 0A  .  
The higher the value of the inequality aversion parameter, , the greater will the value 
of  eF  and hence of eA . 
 The above points can be illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 1. If there are 
two incidents, each point on QQ represents a (F1, F2) combination that yields the 
same (given) total of deaths, F=F1+ F2 and, therefore the same (given) value of 
F =F/2: QQ is the fatality-possibility locus corresponding to F and its slope is -1. 
 For N incidents, the loss function is: 
1 2( , ,..., ),  0,  0,  if 0  and / 0,N i i iL L F F F L L F i L F i         . In additively 
decomposable form, the loss function becomes:
1
( ),  where (.) 0
N
i
i
L F

     
represents society's loss from incident  resulting in  deathsii F .  If (.)  
 19 
is strictly convex then social marginal loss increases for increases in .iF  Consequently, 
for a given total of deaths, F, social loss will be minimised when: 
1 2 .. NF F F   . 
   For N=2, the indifference curves associated with the loss function, with curves 
further away representing higher levels of loss, are superimposed upon QQ .  Social 
loss is minimised at a point where an indifference curve is tangential to QQ and this 
will occur, by convexity of the loss function, when F1=F2.  Consequently, tangency 
between the indifference curve and QQ occurs at a point (A) on the 45
0
 line: 
equilibrium occurs when both incidents result in an identical number of deaths.   
 If, however, the outcomes with respect to the two incidents are at T, then the 
total number of deaths, AB, if distributed according to T, is welfare-equivalent to a 
larger total RS, where RS is equally distributed between the two incidents.  The degree 
of inequality in the inter-incident distribution of the number of deaths is (RS/AB)-1 
and this is also the percentage amount by which the social loss from locating at T 
exceeds its minimum value at A.  The greater the aversion to inequality, the more 
bowed will be the indifference curves, the higher will R be along the 45
0
 line, and the 
greater will be the social loss associated with the point T.  
 Table 10 shows the equally distributed equivalent (ede) number of deaths and 
the ede fatality rate for the three main terrorist groups in India  (Islamic, Marxist, 
North-Eastern), for the two main attack types (armed assault and bombing) under 
different degrees of inequality aversion.  When =0.25 (mildest inequality aversion), 
“society” would be prepared to tolerate 466 deaths (as compared to the actual number 
of 415 deaths) from the 53 Islamic-engendered armed assault attacks, and 396 deaths 
(as compared to the actual number of 313 deaths) from the 56 Islamic-engendered 
bombing attacks, provided these higher numbers were equally distributed between the 
incidents.   
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 For deaths caused by incidents for which North-Eastern groups were 
responsible, “society” would be prepared to tolerate 468 deaths (as compared to the 
actual number of 445 deaths) from the 56 armed assaults carried out by North-Eastern 
groups, and 108 deaths (as compared to the actual number of 93 deaths) from the 27 
bombing attacks carried out by North-Eastern groups, provided these higher numbers 
were equally distributed between the incidents. 
 As inequality to aversion increased, the ede number of deaths and, by 
corollary, the ede fatality rate rose: in order to compensate for the unequal distribution 
of deaths between the different terrorist incidents, “society” would be prepared to 
tolerate increasingly larger numbers of deaths,  provided these were equally 
distributed between the incidents. 
6. Conclusions   
 This paper analysed fatality rates from terrorist incidents in India between 
1998 and 2004 with respect to the terrorist groups responsible for such incidents.  The 
two main conclusions to emerge from this study are that, of the three main terrorist 
groups in India, Islamic terrorists are best “equipped” - by way of temperament, 
weapons, training - to  cause the maximum number of fatalities. On the other hand, in 
terms of “attack type”, North-Eastern terrorist groups, whose favoured mode of attack 
was armed assault, were best placed to cause fatalities.  That the number of fatalities 
from terrorist incidents in the North-East of India was not still higher was due to 
North-Eastern terrorist groups not possessing the “equipment” of Islamic terrorists:  
many cases of armed assault in the North East involved traditional weapons like bows 
and arrows or machetes.  If terrorist groups in the North East were equipped to 
Islamic terrorist standards, the fatality rate in the North East would be considerably 
higher. 
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 Conversely, Islamic groups did not engage in armed assault to the same degree 
as the North-Eastern groups. If Islamic terrorist groups showed the same proclivity 
towards armed assault as North-Eastern terrorist groups then, in consequence of their 
superior “equipment”, fatality rates from terrorist incidents bearing an Islamic stamp 
would rise sharply. The death toll from the Mumbai attacks of 26-29 November 2008 
- when modern weaponry, meticulous planning, rigorous training were all harnessed 
to a cold-blooded disregard for human life – might then be a precursor of further 
carnage in the years to come. 
 Lastly, the paper then applied Atkinson’s (1970) concept of equality-adjusted 
income to terrorism to arrive at the concept of equality-adjusted deaths from terrorist 
incidents: in order to avoid spectacular incidents resulting in the loss of a large 
number of lives – as in New York on September 11, 2001 and in Mumbai 26-29 
November 2008 – “society” might be prepared to tolerate “low-grade” terrorism 
which resulted in a larger number of deaths in total but avoided a large number of 
deaths from a single iconic incident.       
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Table 1: Terrorist Incidents in India by State: 1998-2004 
State Number 
of 
Incidents 
Percentage 
of Total 
Incidents 
Number of 
Fatalities 
Percentage 
of Total  
Fatalities 
Andhra Pradesh  48 6.12 90 2.99 
Arunachal Pradesh  1 0.13 1 0.03 
Assam  85 10.84 376 12.5 
Bihar  26 3.32 156 5.2 
Chandigarh 1 0.13 0 0 
Chhattisgarh  2 0.26 21 0.70 
Delhi  14 1.79 25 0.83 
Goa  1 0.13 0 0 
Gujarat  8 1.02 2 0.07 
Himachal Pradesh  4 0.51 46 1.53 
Jammu and Kashmir  480 61.22 1658 55.11 
Jharkhand  11 1.40 86 2.89 
Karnataka  2 0.26 0 0 
Kerala  3 0.38 0 0 
Madhya Pradesh  1 0.13 22 0.74 
Maharashtra  14 1.79 93 3.09 
Manipur  17 2.17 94 3.12 
Meghalaya  1 0.13 12 0.40 
Mizoram  1 0.13 8 0.27 
Nagaland  1 0.13 12 0.40 
Orissa  3 0.38 7 0.23 
Punjab  4 0.51 10 0.33 
Tamil Nadu  18 2.3 72 2.39 
Tripura  25 3.19 179 9.95 
Uttar Pradesh  4 0.51 23 0.76 
Uttaranchal  1 0.13 2 0.07 
West Bengal  5 0.64 11 0.37 
Unknown 3 0.38 2 0.07 
Total 784 100 3008 100 
Source: LaFree and Dugan (2008) 
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Table 2: Terrorist Incidents in India by Major Groups Responsible, 1998-2004 
Group Number of Incidents Number of Fatalities 
Al-Arifeen 1 6 
Al-Badr 1 0 
Al-Hamas Mujahideen 1 0 
Al-Madina [LeT Front] 3 4 
Al-Mansoorian 1 4 
Al-Mansurian [LeT Front] 3 13 
Al-Omar Mujahedin 2 13 
Al-Shuda Brigade of Jammu and Kashmir 1 8 
Harakat ul-Mujahidin 2 1 
Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami 3 38 
Hizb-ul-Mujahidin 34 173 
Islamic Fateh 1 1 
Islamic Militants 1 1 
Jaish-e-Mohammad 11 39 
Jamaat-ul Mujahideen 4 25 
Kashmir Freedom Force 1 0 
Lashkar-e Taiba 47 371 
Save Kashmir 1 1 
Save Kashmir Movement 2 9 
Students Islamic Movement of India 4 63 
Tehreek-ul-Mujahedeen 1 2 
The Islamic Front 1 10 
Total Islamic Groups 126 782 
Marxist Groups   
Bengali Tiger Force 1 2 
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M) 2 4 
Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) 1 6 
Maoist Communist Center 14 98 
Naxalites 8 31 
People's Liberation Army 1 8 
People's War Group 46 189 
Porattom 1 0 
Praveen Dalam 1 1 
Total Marxist Groups 75 339 
North-East Groups   
All Tripura Tiger Force 6 56 
Bodo Liberation Tigers 6 42 
Dima Halao Daoga (DHD) 5 1 
Kamtapur Liberation Organization 1 4 
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup 2 8 
Karbi National Volunteers 2 10 
Kuki Liberation Army 1 0 
Kuki Revolutionary Army 1 11 
National Democratic Front of Bodoland 14 99 
National Liberation Front of Tripura 21 140 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland 1 10 
United Liberation Front of Assam 36 165 
United People's Democratic Solidarity  1 0 
Total North-East Groups 97 546 
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Table 3: Fatalities by Attack Type 
Assault Type Number of Incidents Number of Fatalities Fatalities-to-
Incidents 
Bombings 378 1049 2.78 
Armed Assault 298 1803 6.05 
Assassination 52 85 1.63 
Infrastructure Attack 35 45 1.29 
Hostages 20 26 1.30 
Unknown 1 0 0 
Total 784 3008 3.84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Fatalities by Terrorist Group 
Groups Number of 
Incidents 
Number of 
Fatalities 
Fatalities-to-
Incidents 
Islamic 126 782 6.21 
Marxist 75 339 4.52 
North-Eastern 97 546 5.63 
Other Groups 87 210 2.41 
Unknown 399 1131 2.83 
Total 784 3008 3.84 
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Table 5: Type of Terrorist Attack in India, 1998-2004 
Group Armed 
Assault 
Bombing Other Total 
Al-Arifeen 0 0 1 1 
Al-Badr 0 1 0 1 
Al-Hamas Mujahideen 0 0 1 1 
Al-Madina [LeT Front] 0 0 3 3 
Al-Mansoorian 0 1 0 1 
Al-Mansurian [LeT Front] 1 1 1 3 
Al-Omar Mujahedin 1 1 0 2 
Al-Shuda Brigade of Jammu and Kashmir 0 1 0 1 
Harakat ul-Mujahidin 1 0 1 2 
Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami 2 1 0 3 
Hizb-ul-Mujahidin 11 20 3 34 
Islamic Fateh 0 1 0 1 
Islamic Militants 0 1 0 1 
Jaish-e-Mohammad 6 5 0 11 
Jamaat-ul Mujahideen 2 2 0 4 
Kashmir Freedom Force 0 0 1 1 
Lashkar-e Taiba 27 13 7 47 
Save Kashmir 0 0 1 1 
Save Kashmir Movement 0 2 0 2 
Students Islamic Movement of India 0 4 0 4 
Tehreek-ul-Mujahedeen 1 0 0 1 
The Islamic Front 0 1 0 1 
Total Islamic Groups 52 55 19 126 
Marxist Groups     
Bengali Tiger Force 1 0 0 1 
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M) 2 0 0 2 
Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) 1 0 0 1 
Maoist Communist Center 7 3 4 14 
Naxalites 5 1 2 8 
People's Liberation Army 1 0 0 1 
People's War Group 9 23 14 46 
Porattom 0 0 1 1 
Praveen Dalam 0 0 1 1 
Total Marxist Groups 26 27 22 75 
North-East Groups     
All Tripura Tiger Force 6 0 0 6 
Bodo Liberation Tigers 4 1 1 6 
Dima Halao Daoga (DHD) 0 0 5 5 
Kamtapur Liberation Organization 1 0 0 1 
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup 1 1 0 2 
Karbi National Volunteers 2 0 0 2 
Kuki Liberation Army 0 0 1 1 
Kuki Revolutionary Army 1 0 0 1 
National Democratic Front of Bodoland 9 4 1 14 
National Liberation Front of Tripura 18 2 1 21 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland 1 0 0 1 
United Liberation Front of Assam 13 18 5 36 
United People's Democratic Solidarity  0 1 0 1 
Total North-East Groups 56 27 14 97 
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Table 6: Regression Estimates, by Group, of the Number of Fatalities from Terrorist 
Attacks in India, 1998-2004 
Type of Assault Coefficient Estimate t-value 
Intercept 1.111 1.50 
Islamic groups 2.065 1.37 
Marxist groups 0.508 0.36 
North-Eastern groups -0.540 -0.33 
Bombing 0.743 0.91 
Islamic bombing 1.772 1.04 
Marxist bombing 3.601 2.03 
North-East bombing 2.130 1.08 
Armed Assault 3.791 4.45 
Islamic armed assault 1.014 0.58 
Marxist armed assault 0.129 0.07 
North-East armed assault 3.584 1.96 
 772 observations, 1998-2004 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Number of Fatalities by Terrorist Group and Attack Type 
 
 Residual 
Group 
Islamic 
Groups 
Marxist 
Groups 
North-
Eastern 
Groups 
Bombing 1.85 5.69 5.96 3.44 
Armed assault 4.90 7.98 5.54 7.94 
Other attack type 1.11 4.29 1.62 0.57 
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Table 8 
The Decomposition of Fatality Rates by Terrorist Group:  
“Blinder-Oaxaca” Method 
 Sample 
Average 
 Group s treated as group r  Group r treated as group s 
 F
r
 - F
s
  Attack Type 
Difference
*
 
Residual  Attack Type 
Difference
**
 
Residual 
r=Islamic 
s=Marxist  
6.21 – 4.52 = 
1.69 
 6.21 – 5.75 = 
0.46 
5.75 – 4.52 = 
1.23 
 5.19 – 4.52 
= 0.67 
6.21 - 5.19 = 
1.02  
r=Islamic  
s=North 
Eastern 
6.21 – 5.63 = 
0.58 
 6.21 – 6.65 
=-0.44 
6.65 – 5.63 = 
1.02 
 4.95 – 5.63 
= -0.68 
6.21 – 4.95 = 
1.26 
r=North-
Eastern 
s=Marxist  
5.63 – 4.52 = 
1.11 
 5.63 – 4.95 = 
0.68 
4.95 – 4.52 = 
0.43 
 5.09 – 4.52 
= 0.57 
5.63 – 5.09 = 
0.54 
F
r
 and F
s
 are the average number of fatalities (fatality rates) from terrorist incidents for which 
group r and group s were, respectively, responsible. 
*
Attack type difference: holding “equipment” constant at group r levels, this difference 
represents the inter-group difference in fatality rates due to differences between the 
two groups, r and s, in their attack types. 
**
 Attack type difference: holding “equipment” constant at group s levels, this difference 
represents the inter-group difference in fatality rates due to differences between the 
two groups, r and s, in their attack types. 
 
 
 
Table 9: Gini Coefficients by Terrorist Group and Type Attack 
 Armed Attack 
Incidents 
Bombing 
Incidents 
Maximum 
Deaths from 
Armed Assault 
Incident 
Maximum 
Deaths from 
Bombing 
Incident 
Islamic 0.534 0.729 52 35 
Marxist 0.538 0.607 26 32 
North-Eastern 0.350 0.619 12 26 
 
  30 
Table 10: Equally Distributed Equivalent Number of Deaths and Fatality Rates for 
Terrorist Groups in India: Armed Assault and Bombing 
 Armed assault Bombing 
 Islamic Marxist North-
East 
Islamic Marxist North-
East 
Number of Incidents 53
*
 26 56 56
*
 27 27 
Number of Deaths 415 144 445 313 161 93 
Deaths per Incident: 
Fatality Rate 
7.98 5.54 7.95 5.69 5.96 3.44 
Inequality Aversion: 
=0.25 
      
Equally distributed 
equivalent (ede) number 
of deaths 
466 163 468 396 187 108 
Equally distributed 
equivalent (ede) fatality 
rate 
8.96 6.27 8.36 7.20 6.93 4.00 
Inequality Aversion: 
=0.5 
      
Equally distributed 
equivalent (ede) number 
of deaths 
516 182 491 478 209 122 
Equally distributed 
equivalent (ede) fatality 
rate 
9.92 7.00 8.77 8.69 7.74 4.52 
Inequality Aversion: 
=0.75 
      
Equally distributed 
equivalent (ede) number 
of deaths 
563 202 513 560 230 133 
Equally distributed 
equivalent (ede) fatality 
rate 
10.82 7.77 9.16 10.18 8.52 4.93 
Inequality Aversion: 
=1.0 
      
Equally distributed 
equivalent (ede) number 
of deaths 
608 222 535 640 248 143 
Equally distributed 
equivalent (ede) fatality 
rate 
11.69 8.54 9.55 11.64 9.19 5.30 
*Number of deaths was not recorded for an armed assault and a bombing incident: hence 
divisorss are 52 and 55 for (Islamic) armed assault and bombing, respectively.
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Figure 1 
The Distribution-Sensitive Fatality Rate 
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Technical Appendix 
Derivation of the attack-type/attack-group interaction equation  
 Define the variables ,,  and j j jI M N  to take the value 1 if incident j was caused 
by, respectively, Islamic, Marxist, or North-Easter groups, and the value 0 otherwise.  
Then the regression equation estimated over M terrorist incidents, j=1…M, was: 
 
( ) ( _ )
( ) ( _ )
( ) ( _ )
( ) ( _ )
j B j A j
B j j A j j
B j j A j j
B j j A j j
Fatalities bombing armed assault
bombing I armed assault I
bombing M armed assault M
bombing N armed assault N
  
 
 
 
  
   
   
   
 
 The coefficients  and B A   in the above equation are the fatalities associated 
with bombings and armed assault, respectively, when a non-Islamic/Marxist/North-
Eastern group was responsible for the incident; the  and B A   are the additional 
fatalities associated with bombings and armed assault, respectively, when an Islamic 
group was responsible for the incident;  the  and B A   are the additional fatalities 
associated with bombings and armed assault, respectively, when a Marxist group was 
responsible for the incident; and the  and B A   are the additional fatalities associated 
with bombings and armed assault, respectively, when a North-Eastern group was 
responsible for the incident. 
 
Derivation of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition as applied to 
terrorism 
 
 There are K incidents (indexed, k=1…K) of which KI are by Islamic groups, 
KM by Marxists, and KN by North-Eastern groups.  j=I (Islamic), M (Marxist.), j=N 
(North-East). Let  , 1...
ks
j j
s X s S X represents the vector of observations, for 
incident k of group j, on S variables which determine the number of fatalities, Yk, from 
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that incident, and let ˆ , 1...j js s S β represent the associated vector of coefficient 
estimates for persons from group j.  
 Then the average number of fatalities from terrorist incidents for which group 
j was responsible, j=I, M, N, is: 
 1
1 1
ˆ  , ,
jK S
j j j
j ks s
k s
Y K X j I M N
 
 
  
 
    
So that:   
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ           (A)
ˆ ˆ
I M
I M
M
K KS S
I M I I M M
I ks s M ks s
k s k s
K KS S
I I M I
I ks s M ks s
k s k s
K S S
M I M M
M ks s M ks s
k s k s
Y Y K X K X
K X K X
K X K X
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
   
   
     
   
    
     
    
   
    
   
   
   
  
1
         (B)
MK 
 
 

                   
 
Alternatively: 
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ           (C)
ˆ ˆ
I M
I M
I
K KS S
I M I I M M
I ks s M ks s
k s k s
K KS S
I M M M
I ks s M ks s
k s k s
K S S
I I I M
I ks s I ks s
k s k s
Y Y K X K X
K X K X
K X K X
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
   
   
     
   
    
     
    
   
    
   
   
   
  
1
         (D)
MK 
 
 

 
 
 The term (A), above, represents the attack type difference when Marxist attack 
types are evaluated at Islamic equipment; the term (C) represents the attack type 
difference when Islamic attack types are evaluated at Marxist equipment.  The terms 
(B) and (D) are the residual terms.  By definition, I MY Y A B C D     .  
However, this does not imply that A=C and B=D: that is, it does not imply that the 
size of the attribute (“attack type”) and coefficient (“residual”) effects are invariant to 
choices of a common coefficient vector.   
